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here is somewhat of a consensus
among economists that labor market
rigidities are responsible for high
unemployment in Europe, and in particu-
lar for its most alarming aspects such as 
its long duration and high incidence on
youth.  Unemployment beneﬁts lower 
the incentive for job search and increase
wage pressure by insiders.  Minimum
wages price the least skilled out of the
market.  Firing costs deter hiring, thus
reducing labor demand, and hamper the
economy’s ability to deal with uncer-
tainty and structural change.  This is 
why experts frequently recommend 
making the labor market more ﬂexible, 
as is exempliﬁed by the conclusions of 
the recent OECD Jobs Study (1995).
But, in practice, few of the remedies
economists advocate pass the test of politi-
cal viability.  In 1994, an attempt by the
French government to lower the minimum
wage for young workers was followed by
violent demonstrations, and the govern-
ment eventually withdrew its reform pro-
posal.  In 1995, in order to be elected, a
French presidential candidate put on its
platform an increase in the minimum
wage.  In 1994, the Swedish government
lost the elections because it had lowered
the unemployment beneﬁt replacement
ratio from 90 percent to 80 percent.  After
reuniﬁcation, the German government
gave in to western unions’ pressure and
allowed eastern wages to converge rapidly
to western levels, despite large productivi-
ty differentials and the need to restructure
the eastern economy, which led to substan-
tially higher unemployment rates in the
East than in the West.
In my view, an understanding of the
political determinants of labor market
institutions is a crucial prerequisite for
being able to implement structural reforms
that are acceptable to those social groups
that potentially may block these reforms.
While we believe that the set of insti-
tutions that prevail in many European
countries form a coherent whole, given 
the complexity of the issue it is often 
more convenient to analyze these institu-
tions separately from each other.  In this
paper we focus on employment protection
legislation (also called “ﬁring costs”).  We
want to know who gains and who loses
from such regulation, and what will be 
the equilibrium level of employment 
protection.  We abstract from other rigidi-
ties—we do not ignore them, but take
them as given, ignoring that they, too, 
are the outcome of the political process.
Why ﬁring costs rather than other insti-
tutions?  This is partly a matter of taste and I
have discussed other institutions elsewhere.1
But there are several reasons why employ-
ment protection is more relevant than other
rigidities when one deals with the political
economy of reform.  First, it is regularly
pointed out by employers as one of the 
most severe constraints on their incentives 
to create jobs.  Second, it is somewhat more
renegotiable than minimum wages or unem-
ployment beneﬁts.  Some reductions in ﬁring
costs have been observed in various countries
in the eighties and nineties.  We have not
seen similar reductions in unemployment
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compensation or minimum wage laws.
Unemployment beneﬁts are seen as part of 
the “welfare state” and attempts to reduce
them often are interpreted as a ﬁrst blow to
the whole welfare state, while the minimum
wage is often an untouchable symbol.2 Third,
while ﬁring costs’ impact on employment is
actually unclear,3 they clearly increase unem-
ployment duration.  If anything, the key
difference between Europe and the United
States is not so much the former’s higher
unemployment rate—which partly reﬂects
composition effects and a greater incentive 
to register as unemployed—as Europe’s much
larger unemployment duration.4
Behind the political support for
employment protection lies the existence
of rents in favor of the employed, which
arise due to imperfections in the labor
market.  We understand ﬁring costs as a
device to protect the rents of incumbent
employees.  The greater these rents, the
greater their incentive to support protec-
tive measures.
We deﬁne the “rent” as the welfare 
differential between an employed and 
an unemployed worker.  In a perfectly
competitive labor market, this differential
should be equal to zero, because any worker
looking for a job would ﬁnd one instanta-
neously at the going equilibrium wage.
Thus, there would be no welfare difference
between the employed and the unem-
ployed.  In practice, the employed have
rents, that is, they are strictly better off
than the unemployed.  The size of these
rents depends on their bargaining power
(their ability to prevent the unemployed
from underbidding them, which itself is
affected by labor market institutions), and
also how closely their work effort can be
monitored by employers.  The rent is a
measure of how far wage setting is from
competitive behavior; the higher the rent,
the less competitive wage formation and
the higher the natural rate of unemploy-
ment.  Most of the essence of labor market
reform is about eliminating the rent.  This
is certainly true of any reform of the mini-
mum wage and the bargaining process, or
of any change that makes it easier for out-
siders to compete with insiders: hiring
rules, work rules, and many aspects of
employment protection.  Here, however,
we take the workers’ bargaining power as
given, and consider what happens when
people vote on a ﬁring cost that does not
directly affect their bargaining power.
Rents have important consequences 
for the political preferences of incumbent
employees.  This is because the rent tells 
us how much they lose if they lose their
jobs, or how much they are willing to pay
for keeping them.  The greater the rent, the
greater the aversion of insiders to unem-
ployment and the greater the political sup-
port for employment protection legislation.
Employment protection legislation is com-
plex; it associates to each cause of ﬁring a
set of constraints imposed on the employer.
These constraints include severance pay-
ments, administrative supervision, obliga-
tion to provide the displaced workers with
job counseling and to give them priority
over hiring by the same conglomerate,
unions’ right of scrutiny and appeal, etc.
To some extent, these constraints increase
the employee’s bargaining power by mak-
ing it more difﬁcult for the employer to
resist wage demands by refusing to employ
the worker any longer.  The direct effect 
of ﬁring costs, however, is to make it more
costly for the ﬁrm to adjust its labor force
when facing a fall in demand.  Because 
we want to isolate the pure employment
protection effect of ﬁring costs, we shall
assume that it does not affect the workers’
bargaining power.
Unlike my previous work on the same
topic (Saint-Paul, 1993, 1997), this paper
pays a lot of attention to the role of ﬁring
costs in the growth process when obsoles-
cence—or “creative destruction”—is an
important aspect of growth.  In our vintage
capital model, each match gradually
becomes obsolete (because its productivity
fails to catch up with the latest technology)
until it is destroyed, at which time the worker
becomes unemployed.  We assume people
vote between two levels of the ﬁring cost 
(a “ﬂexible” and a “rigid” one).  In our
model, ﬁring costs increase the life span of
any match by inducing ﬁrms to postpone
the date of economic obsolescence.FEDERAL  RESERVE  BANK  OF  ST. LOUIS
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In voting in favor of employment pro-
tection, incumbent employees trade off
lower living standards (because employ-
ment protection maintains workers in less
productive activities) against longer job
duration.  The support for employment
protection will then depend on the value
of the latter relative to the cost of the for-
mer.  We highlight two key determinants
of this trade-off: ﬁrst, the workers’ bargain-
ing power; second, the economy’s growth
rate—more precisely its rate of creative
destruction.  Let us explain brieﬂy the
mechanisms that underlie the effect of
these two parameters.
The rent.  The value of longer job
duration to incumbent workers is propor-
tional to the rent, or equivalently, their
bargaining power; long job duration would
not be valued if the employed were not
earning rents above the unemployed.  The
cost of job loss would then be zero, and so
would the support for employment protec-
tion.  This result tells us that there exists 
a “complementarity” between ﬁring costs
and other labor market rigidities to the
extent that the latter increases workers’
bargaining power.
One important consequence is the
existence of complementarities across 
policy reforms.  A comprehensive labor
market reform attacks those rigidities—
one that increases workers’ bargaining
power at the same time that it reduces ﬁr-
ing costs—is more likely to be successful
than one that only tackles the latter aspect.
Creative destruction.  Firing costs reduce
the economy’s average productivity by main-
taining a fraction of the workforce in vintages
that are older than the most up-to-date tech-
nology.  In equilibrium, this ends up reducing
wages and living standards.  Now, this effect
will be stronger, the greater the productivity
gap between old vintages and new vintages,
that is, the greater the growth rate.  A higher
growth rate consequently reduces the political
support for employment protection legisla-
tion, because it increases its cost in terms of
lower wages.
We show that the political support for
ﬁring costs typically comes from a fraction
of the employed workers: those who work in
matches that are not too old, nor too young.
In the ﬁrst case, workers are going to lose
their jobs quickly; they are better off unem-
ployed in a ﬂexible society than employed 
in a rigid society.  In the second case (which
may be degenerate and reduced to an empty
set), workers consider that the end of their
job is pretty remote and are not willing to
pay the cost of employment regulation.
We supplement our analytical reasoning
with some evidence suggesting that increas-
es in ﬁring costs tend to occur at times when
workers’ weight in bargaining is high, and,
conversely, reductions in ﬁring costs take
place when bargaining power is low.  This 
is in accordance with our model.
EMPLOYMENT 
PROTECTION IN A 
RENOVATING ECONOMY
Let us consider a world with different
vintages of capital.5 At any point in time 
t there is a state-of-the-art technology that
allows production of units of output
with one unit of labor, where is assumed 
to grow at a constant exogenous rate g, so
that .  There is free entry of ﬁrms
(considered as hiring a single worker) in
the state-of-the-art technology; but once 
a ﬁrm has entered, it cannot upgrade.  It is
stuck with the level prevailing at the time
of entry.
If exit were costless, ﬁrms would enter
the market for a very small amount of time
and then disappear, because competition
by new entrants would constantly drive
wages up to the state-of-the art technology
level, thus making any old plant unprof-
itable.  We assume, however, that exit is
costly so that in order to close at time T
the ﬁrm pays a ﬁring cost in terms of out-
put, equal to .6 We assume that this
ﬁring cost is wasted.  Firing costs imply
that unproﬁtable plants, instead of closing,
will continue until losses become so large
that it is actually preferable to pay the ﬁr-
ing cost and close the position.  By the
same token, for new jobs to be created, 
it must be the case that they run positive
proﬁts in the beginning of their lifetime, 
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to compensate for the future losses associ-
ated with the ﬁring cost.  Therefore, wages
cannot be as high as the state-of-the art
technology level, contrary to what would
happen absent exit costs.
Firms and workers can freely borrow
and lend at the real interest rate r.  We
assume r > g, which guarantees that the
present discounted value of income
streams will be well deﬁned.
Workers are homogenous and negotiate
wages in an imperfectly competitive fashion,
thus being able to raise their welfare strictly
above their outside opportunity—that is,
the welfare of an unemployed worker.
Consequently, in equilibrium, there is a
positive stock of involuntarily unemployed
workers who wait to ﬁnd a job created 
by a new entrant.
At any time t the net value of a ﬁrm
that entered the market at date s is equal 
to the present discounted value of its prof-
its minus the (discounted) ﬁring cost it
has to pay upon termination:
(1)
where is the bargained wage
between ﬁrms and workers at date u,
which will be determined below.
The ﬁrm sets its exit time optimally 
by maximizing expression 1 with respect
to T(s).  The ﬁrst order condition is:  
(2)  .
The left-hand side is the loss per period
made by the ﬁrm while the right-hand side 
is the annuity value of the ﬁring cost.  Note
that faster growth reduces the annuity value
of the ﬁring cost: As they are indexed on the
economy’s growth trend, postponing dis-
missal increases the value of the ﬁring cost.
This effect reduces the opportunity cost of
ﬁring today.7 Finally, the free-entry condi-
tion implies that the net value of the ﬁrm 
is zero at the time it enters the market:
(4)                    
We now turn to wage determination.
Our key assumption is that workers can
appropriate a share of the surplus generat-
ed by the match gross of the ﬁring cost.
Formally, this is equivalent to 
(5)     
where is the share of the gross surplus
that the worker is able to appropriate,
is the income ﬂow of an unemployed
worker (for example, the unemployment
beneﬁts he is paid), is the probability 
per unit of time that an unemployed 
worker ﬁnds a job, while
(6) 
is simply the present discounted value of
the ﬁrm’s gross output.
The meaning of equation 5 is as 
follows.  The last term is the fraction 
of the match’s output appropriated by 
the worker.  The ﬁrst two terms are the
worker’s “alternative wage,” or outside
option, that is, the wage that would make 
him just indifferent between being unem-
ployed and working for that ﬁrm.  The
ﬁrst term represents the unemployed’s 
ﬂow of income, while the second term 
represents the contribution to his welfare
of the future rents he will appropriate 
from his next jobs.  It is larger, the greater
the probability of ﬁnding a job and the
larger the share of the surplus appropriat-
ed by the worker.8
The probability of ﬁnding a job,
, is the key endogenous variable 
that determines the adjustment of the
labor market.  Its equilibrium value is
determined by the free-entry condition,
equation 4, that requires that the net 
value of a newborn ﬁrm be equal to 
zero.  If the labor market were too tight,
relative to that equilibrium value of ,
wages would be too high and new ﬁrms’
net value would be negative.  Conse-
quently, ﬁrms would not enter the 
market, which would reduce the job-
ﬁnding probability and push wages 
downwards to the point where the 
free-entry condition is met again.
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EQUILIBRIUM
We are now in a position to compute
the equilibrium of our economy.  To do so,
we limit ourselves to a “steady state,” that
is, a balanced growth path where wages
and output grow at rate g,  while unem-
ployment, labor market tightness  , and
the duration of a job are constant.  Let us
call that constant duration x.
To do so, we proceed as follows.  First,
note that the ﬁrm’s present discounted out-
put, in steady state, is simply equal to  
(7)             .
The term (1–  e–rx)/r  is simply the pre-
sent discounted equivalent of a constant,
unit ﬂow of income over a time interval of
length x.  Substituting equation 7 into the
wage equation 5 we get that  
(8)        
where, as previously, the ﬁrst two terms
represent the alternative wage and the last
term the rent earned on one’s current job.
Using that condition, we can rewrite the
optimal closing condition, equation 2, as
(9)
This is a ﬁrst equation that gives us a rela-
tionship between x  and  .  This is a decreas-
ing equilibrium relationship that tells us that 
a tighter labor market pushes wages up, thus
forcing ﬁrms to close at an earlier time.
Next, using the free-entry condition 4
along with the wage equation 5 and with
equation 7, then making use of equation 9,
we get a second equation that determines x:
(10)  .
The left-hand side is the present dis-
counted value of proﬁts, gross of the ﬁring
cost,9 and the right-hand side is equal to
the ﬁring cost.  The equation tells us that
under free entry the cumulated proﬁts
must exactly cover the ﬁring cost.  As long
as  equation 10 deﬁnes a
unique equilibrium value of x.  If F  is
greater than  , then it is optimal
for ﬁrms never to close, a case we rule out
by assumption.
The equilibrium is determined in
Figure 1 by the intersection of two sched-
ules, a downward sloping schedule WW
deﬁned by equation 9, and a vertical one
PP  deﬁned by equation 10.
The equilibrium has the following
properties:  
•  An increase in  , the workers’ bar-
gaining power, shifts PP  to the right
and WW  downward (Figure 2a).  
Consequently, the duration of 
matches increases and labor market 
tightness declines.  An increase in
directly increases labor costs, which 
reduces incentives for job creation 
but makes it affordable to close later.  
At the same time, proﬁts fall, so the
job must last longer in equilibrium 
in order for cumulated proﬁts to 
cover the ﬁring cost.
• An increase in F, the ﬁring cost,
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upward, (Figure 2b).  A higher 
ﬁring cost makes it optimal to 
postpone the closing time, and 
jobs must last longer for cumulated
proﬁts to cover the ﬁring cost.  
Despite the upward shift in WW,   
unambiguously falls: Labor 
market tightness is reduced as 
increased ﬁring costs discourage 
hirings.  The upward shift in WW
simply means that at any given job 
duration, one would require higher
wages and therefore tighter labor 
markets for closing to be optimal.
•  An increase in g, the growth rate, 
unambiguously shifts PP  to 
the left while WW  shifts down 
(Figure 2c).  Faster growth 
increases the pace of obsoles-
cence via more rapid wage growth 
within existing matches, and also 
because the growth of ﬁring costs 
is faster, as they are indexed on 
the economy’s average produc-
tivity level.  The incentives to ﬁre 
are therefore increased: Matches 
are shorter (PP  shifts to the left), 
while the degree of labor market 
tightness that makes it optimal to 
ﬁre falls (WW  shifts down).  The 
net effect on  is ambiguous as 
WW  is downward sloping.  
Next, it is possible to characterize the
equilibrium unemployment rate and the
steady-state distribution of employment
across vintages.  In steady state, the density
of employment in ﬁrms aged z  is constant
and equal to 1/x.  If l  is total employment,
then the number of jobs destroyed per unit
of time is l/x.  In steady state, this must be
equal to the outﬂow from unemployment,
which is equal to (1 – l).  This allows us
to compute the unemployment rate as a
function of  and x:
(11) .
It should be noted that unemployment
is not necessarily higher when ﬁring costs
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which tends to reduce u, but reduces x,
which tends to increase u.  Job creation 
is higher but so is job destruction, so
unemployment may either rise or decline.
This is well known from the analysis of 
ﬁring costs.10
One can further compute aggregate
output in steady state.  It is simply equal 
to the product of employment and average
productivity.  Given that employment is
uniformly distributed over all vintages, 
the latter is simply equal to
At any point in time t  output is there-
fore equal to 
.
Note that in the extreme case, where 
the ﬁring cost goes to zero, so does x, while
goes to inﬁnity.  The labor market converges
to a situation where both the job creation
rate and the job destruction rate are inﬁnite.
As technology changes continuously and is
embodied into new vintages, it is optimal to
close ﬁrms an instant after they have been
created.  As a result, people move constantly
between employment and unemployment: 
It is as if unemployment were equally 
shared among the workforce.  Furthermore,
because of free entry, the wage is always
equal to  at, the state-of-the art productivity,
and is higher than it would be for any posi-
tive level of the ﬁring cost.
With that discussion, we conclude the
characterization of equilibrium.  We now
proceed and discuss voting on ﬁring costs.
VOTING ON FIRING COSTS
In the sequel, we will assume that 
society votes once and for all between 
two alternatives: a “rigid” society associat-
ed with a ﬁring cost and a plant life ,
and a “ﬂexible” society associated
with and .  Therefore, we
assume that there are only two alterna-
tives, reﬂecting the fact that there is some
indivisibility in the design of legislation
and that political agendas are often formu-
lated in a binary fashion.  We will typically
consider that the status quo is the “rigid
society,” so that initially workers are distrib-
uted over plants aged between 0 and .
We also assume, for simplicity, that when 
we do comparative statics the underlying
values of the ﬁring costs and are
altered so as to maintain the two options
invariant in terms of plant duration.
The Shape of Preferences for
Employment Protection
The ﬁrst step is to compute the utility
of the employed and unemployed voters as
a function of the collectively decided ﬁring
cost.  The utility of the unemployed is
given simply by the present discounted
value of the alternative wage, that is, of the
ﬁrst two terms in 8.  Its value is 
.
As future alternative wages grow at
rate , this stream of income is discounted
at rate .  Substituting in the equilibri-
um conditions, equations 9 and 10, we see
that this is equivalent to  
(12)   
.
This formula allows us to express the
utility of the employed as a function solely
of the equilibrium value of plant’s lifetime, x.
As for the utility of employed workers,
it depends on which plant they are work-
ing at.  The older the plant, the lower the
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lower their utility.  More precisely, an
employed’s utility is the sum of an unem-
ployed’s utility and the present discounted
value of the employed’s share of the gross
surplus between now and the closing time.
The corresponding value is  
(13)
The last term in the brackets repre-
sents the present discounted value of the
rent to be earned until the current job
elapses.  It is larger, the larger the voted
value of x, and smaller, the larger the 
current age of the job z.
It is important to note that equation 13
is only valid if .  Once people have
voted on x, all ﬁrms with age , if any,
instantaneously disappear and ﬁre their
workers.  Therefore, the utility of any
worker in a plant older than x is by deﬁni-
tion equal to the utility of an unemployed:
.
In equations 12 and 13, F is treated as a
function of x as deﬁned by equation 10; that
is, voting on F or voting on x are equivalent
given the relationship between the two that
must hold in equilibrium.  In the sequel, we
ﬁnd it easier to consider that workers actu-
ally vote between two values of x.
How do, now, the preferences of the
people for ﬁring costs depend on their labor
market status?  Beginning with the unem-
ployed, equation 12 clearly implies that
their utility is strictly decreasing with x.  The
unemployed prefer the lowest possible value
of x (or, alternatively, F).  In the F = 0 equi-
librium, people move constantly between
employment and unemployment so that it 
is as if the total amount of work were shared
perfectly among people.  The incumbent
employee’s advantage for tomorrow’s jobs 
is eliminated; as this equilibrium yields the
highest probability of ﬁnding a job and 
the highest wage, it is the one preferred 
by the unemployed.
Turning now to the employed, equa-
tion 13 implies that their utility is always
decreasing with z and increasing with x
if and only if
(14) .
For any given x, workers in older 
ﬁrms have a lower utility than workers 
in younger ﬁrms, as they expect their rent
from employment to be exhausted earlier.
The marginal gain from increasing 
ﬁring costs is larger, the older the vintage
where the worker is working.  This is
because the remaining duration of their
job increases more, in proportional terms,
than those of workers at younger plants.
Consequently, a marginal increase in ﬁring
costs would be supported by those work-
ers whose vintage is greater than a critical
z*, deﬁned by
.
This property tells us that in some 
sense workers at older plants like ﬁring
costs better, but it should be remembered
that we actually rule out voting on a mar-
ginal increase in ﬁring costs as we only
consider two alternatives.
Note that if  
(15)                  ,
then the numerator is negative (or equiva-
lently, the right-hand side of 14 is lower
than 1), which implies that all employed
workers beneﬁt from a marginal increase 
in ﬁring costs.
In the sequel, we shall assume that 
condition 15 holds, and discuss the
case later.
Figure 3 illustrates how preferences
depend on x for various types of workers
in the case where .  The down- j > g r /
j > g r /
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ward sloping curve Cu represents the 
preferences of an unemployed worker.  
C0 represents the preferences of a worker
at a newly created plant.  Cz represents 
the utility of a worker at a plant of age 
z  for x  > z.  It is important to note that 
for x  <  z,  his utility is given by Cu. 
represents the utility of a worker with
.  As z  increases, Cz shifts down 
and its slope shifts up.  While people
employed at old plants enjoy ﬁring costs
more at the margin than people working 
at new plants, they also are increasingly
unhappy as the age of their plant increases.
Voting Between Two Values of the
Firing Cost
We now turn to the question of who 
will favor ﬂexibility and who will oppose 
it when people choose between xR and xF.
Figure 3 is a useful starting point.  As the
unemployed’s utility is monotonically
decreasing in x, they clearly support the 
lowest value of the ﬁring cost.  What about
the employed?  They typically split into 
two groups, as illustrated in Figure 4.  There
exists a critical plant age such that work-
ers in plants older than favor ﬂexibility
while workers below favor rigidity.  In 
the rigid society, workers at plants of age
get exactly the same utility as an unem-
ployed worker of the ﬂexible society.
Workers of the ﬁrst group are in a
match that is about to expire.  They have
consumed most of their rent and expect 
to be soon unemployed and to suffer from
the low job creation rate and the low pro-
ductivity of the economy.  They would be
better off either with an increase in ﬁring
cost beyond  xR, but such an increase is not
on the political agenda, or with a decrease
in ﬁring costs.  Thus, if the status quo is
the rigid society, they end up voting for 
the ﬂexible one.  The reason why this 
“lost generation” prefers ﬂexibility is that
they will soon be constrained to a “new
start” anyway, and the ﬂexible society is
the one that gives them the best chances.
If the status quo is the ﬂexible society, this
group would not exist since  is always
greater than xR.
Workers such that  prefer 
to maintain the rigid society: They will lose
their jobs if the economy were to shift to
ﬂexibility, and their jobs will last long
enough to make rigidity worthwhile for
them.  Workers such that  will not
lose their jobs if the economy becomes ﬂex-
ible.  They prefer the rigid society because it
increases the length of time over which they
reap their rent, while the prospects of job
loss is too remote for them to worry about
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Effects of Growth and Workers’
Bargaining Power
How do the parameters of the model
affect the outcome? The two parameters in
which we are most interested are , the
workers’ bargaining power, and g, the
growth rate.
To analyze the effect of these parame-
ters, it is useful to distinguish between 
three groups: those who work at a vintage
young enough (z< xF) so that they would 
be employed in both the rigid and the ﬂexi-
ble world; the unemployed; and those 
who are employed in the rigid world but
would lose their job if society decided to
become ﬂexible (z > xF).  Let us start with 
an increase in the workers’ bargaining
power .  In general, for a given F, a change
in affects x.  Now, for simplicity, we
assume that the two alternatives are speci-
ﬁed in terms of x rather than F.  That is, we
assume that the two job lengths xR and xF
do not change.  As equation 13 shows, an
increase in reduces the ﬁrst term in brack-
ets—the value of being unemployed—but
increases the second term—the rent.  As
rents are higher, incumbent employees are
more in favor of employment protection.
Consider workers that would be
employed in both worlds, that is, such
that .  Their net gain from being in 
the rigid world instead of the ﬂexible one is
This is clearly increasing with .  As for
the unemployed, their welfare difference
between the two economies is
.
Their net loss from rigidity is decreasing
with .  As increases, other labor market
rigidities are more important relative to ﬁr-
ing costs in reducing the unemployed’s job
prospects so that their welfare loss between
the high and low ﬁring cost societies is
actually reduced.
Finally, those workers who would 
lose their jobs if the economy were to shift
from rigidity to ﬂexibility have a gain from
ﬂexibility equal to
.
This is the sum of the (negative) 
welfare gain of the unemployed, which, 
as we have seen, increases with and 
the employee’s rents in the rigid economy,
which also clearly increase with .  Thus,
these people gain more, or lose less, from
rigidity when increases.
Therefore, in an economy with a high
value of —powerful employees—a given
individual, whether working in a plant of
any age z or unemployed, will always be
more in favor of rigidity than in a world
were is low.  Is it obvious, then, that the
political support for the rigid society is
greater?  The answer is no.  For it is also
true that unemployment is higher when
is large, which tends to push up the num-
ber of people who oppose rigidity, even
though these people lose less from rigid-
ity than if were small.  What is clear,
however, is that within the employed, the
support for rigidity increases, meaning
that the critical plant age increases. 
( must satisfy , and that
function is decreasing with z and shifts 
up when increases.)  If labor market
institutions were mostly determined 
by the employed, say because they are 
j
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jbetter organized collectively or because 
the unemployed have a low rate of par-
ticipation in elections, then the political
support for rigidity would unambiguously
increase when  rises.  Another way to 
put it is to say that controlling  for the
unemployment rate, the high ﬁring cost is
more likely to be chosen when  is higher.
What happens, now, when the growth
rate is larger? If we compare the high
growth economy and its low growth coun-
terpart at two points in time when they
have the same technological level, which
amounts to holding a0egt constant in our
comparisons, the above formulae imply
that an increase in g  reduces Ge, Gu, and
.  Consequently, faster growth unam-
biguously reduces the political support 
for employment protection if we hold the
stock of unemployment constant.
The growth rate acts in two ways.
First, it increases the obsolescence rate
and, therefore, the deadweight cost of
maintaining relatively unproductive
matches idle.  This in itself reduces the
support for employment protection.
Second, faster growth tends to reduce 
the effective discount rate applied to the
future:  Incumbent workers put more
weight on the lower job ﬁnding rate they
will experience once their current match 
is dissolved, because future jobs pay more.
This also tends to reduce the support for
employment protection.
The j   < g/r Case   
What happens now if  ?
Equation 14 implies that workers with 
sufﬁciently small z  will have a utility
strictly decreasing with x.  As illustrated
on Figure 5, the ﬂexible society is pre-
ferred by a group of workers who work 
in the most recent plants.  These workers
lose more, in terms of lower wages, than
they gain in terms of a postponed dis-
missal.  There are now three interest
groups among the employed.  Those 
who work at plants younger than z*  have 
a utility that is decreasing with the ﬁring
cost, so that they will always prefer the
ﬂexible economy.  Those who work at
plants older than  are about to lose their
jobs and oppose rigidity for the reasons
already explained.  Those who work in
plants between z*  and  gain more from
rigidity than what they lose.  Thus, among
the employed, labor market reform (in the
sense of a deregulation) would be support-
ed by an “extreme coalition” of people
working in either the most dynamic plants
or plants that soon will become obsolete.
Another property of this case is that
the maximum welfare point is actually
attained at x  = 0.  Since workers at young
plants are always happier, given x,  than
workers at old plants, and since those at
plants just created (z  = 0) have a utility
which is decreasing with x, there would 
be unanimity in favor of a zero ﬁring cost,
if this is a feasible outcome.
Conversely, if the status quo is x  = 0
then all employed workers work in plants
of age z  = 0.  A necessary condition for
zero ﬁring costs to remain a political equi-
librium is therefore that workers at plants
with z  = 0 would be worse off if ﬁring costs
were higher, which given equation 14, is
precisely equivalent to  .
Therefore, for a “ﬂexible” society to 
be stable (in the sense that people will 
not want to change its institutions), it
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Figure 5
Three groups in the     











jof the surplus does not exceed the ratio
between the growth rate and the interest
rate.  This simple formula (which we are
tempted to label the “golden rule of ﬂexi-
bility”) is a useful shortcut for thinking








The above analysis suggests that 
there are three important determinants 
of reform, namely the workers’ bargaining
power, the growth rate, and the interest
rate.  It is, therefore, tempting to take
these predictions to the data and see how
they square with reality.  Now the question
arises of how literally one can interpret
our results.  For example, the importance
of the growth rate, in our analysis, cap-
tures the role of the rate of renovation of
old plants in the long run.  By contrast,
macroeconomic data on growth mostly
capture cyclical ﬂuctuations and changes
in the underlying trend of productivity
that may not be associated with changes 
in creative destruction.  The real interest
rate may not play a big role if incumbent
employees have only an imperfect access
to capital markets.
Furthermore, what is relevant for 
people’s voting behavior is not the current
level of the growth rate and the interest
rate, but the whole path that they are
expected to follow in the future.
For that reason, we prefer to focus 
on perhaps the most robust prediction of 
the model, that is, the positive relationship
between the workers’ bargaining power 
and the support for employment protection.
Our strategy is to construct a time series 
for that bargaining power for a selection 
of European countries and see if it bears a 
relationship with the timing of reforms.
How can one construct a proxy for
workers’ share in bargaining?  One simple
approach would be to take the share of
labor in national income.  This share, 
however, typically reﬂects other phenome-
na as well, such as variations in factor
inputs as a reaction to changes in factor
prices.  Bentolila and Saint-Paul (1998)
show that such movements are associated
with a relationship between the labor share
and the capital/output ratio.  To proxy for
workers’ bargaining power, we just take
the residual of a ﬁrst-difference regression
of the labor share on the capital/output
ratio.11 Our results are conditional on 
the validity of that proxy, which clearly
may be questioned.  The capital/output
ratio ﬁlters out many sources of move-
ments of the labor share unrelated to bar-
gaining power, but other sources remain.12
One should also keep in mind that our
measure is positively related to the eco-
nomic cycle, so that correlation between
that measure and the timing of reforms
may also capture other mechanisms.  The
results we present, therefore, should be
interpreted with caution.
Figures 6 through 10 represent the
evolution of our measure of the workers’
bargaining power for the ﬁve largest
European countries.  These ﬁgures are not
comparable across countries and the initial
value cannot be interpreted.  Only the evo-
lution within each country is meaningful.
The evolution of our measure is some-
what related to the reforms that actually
took place.13 For example, in Spain, our
measure dropped sharply between 1978
and 1984, suggesting the opening of a
“window of opportunity” for reducing ﬁr-
ing costs in 1984.  It is precisely that year
that a major reform was introduced with
the liberalization of the use of temporary
contracts.  Prior to that reform temporary
contracts mostly were restricted to work 
of temporary nature, as in many other
European countries, and temporary con-
tracts only accounted for 10 percent of the
workforce.  In 1984, however, the govern-
ment made it possible to use those con-
tracts over a wide range of circumstances.
This amounted to a substantial reduction
of ﬁring costs as employers could simply
hire a worker on a temporary contract 
11See Bentolila and Saint-Paul
(1998) for more details.
12Again, we refer the reader to
Bentolila and Saint-Paul
(1998) for a detailed analysis.
13See Saint-Paul (1996b) for 
a discussion of these reforms
and their determinants.  In 
that paper, I actually ignore the
role of workers’ rent, focusing
on the employed’s exposure to
unemployment and on the num-
ber of unemployed workers as
factors important for the viability
of reform.
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expired if they wanted to get rid of the
worker.  The graph for Spain tells us that
this reform came into effect at a time when
the rent of the employed had substantially
declined from the peak it had reached in
the mid-seventies, so that the resistance 
of the insiders to such a reduction in 
ﬁring costs was considerably lower than 
if one had attempted to implement it in,
say, 1980.
In the United Kingdom, the fall in
workers’ bargaining power apparently
occurred earlier than in Spain, so that 
the window of opportunity began in the
late seventies/early eighties.  Again, this
squares with our theory, because this inter-
val coincides with the rise to power of a
conservative government, who subse-
quently engaged in comprehensive labor
market reform, including a reduction 
of ﬁring costs.  Note that despite these
reforms, workers’ bargaining power seems
to go up again thereafter; this captures the
high wage inﬂation of the second half of
the eighties, but there was no reversal of
the reforms.
In France, the decline of workers’ bar-
gaining power occurs somewhat later than
in Spain and the U.K.; but again, the open-
ing of the window of opportunity, 1986,
coincides with the rise to power of a conser-
vative government and a reduction in ﬁring
costs—namely, the suppression of the com-
pulsory administrative approval for layoffs,
which was established in 1974 (at a time 
of rising bargaining power but before it
reached its peak).  Our proxy, on the other
hand, fails to account for an increase in ﬁr-
ing costs that was implemented in 1989
when the Left returned to power.
Reforms that reduce ﬁring costs 
have been much milder in Germany 
than in Spain, perhaps reﬂecting a soci-
ety that needs greater consensus to move
ahead and is, therefore, more likely to 
stay where it is.  Nevertheless, the timing
of the reform matches our analysis well.
As in Spain, temporary contracts were 
liberalized in 1984 (although this was
much more timid than in Spain), after 
a sharp drop of our estimated workers’
bargaining power.
Of all the countries we deal with, 
Italy is the one most characterized by
“stop-and-go” policies.  Reductions in 
ﬁring costs alternate frequently with
increases in ﬁring costs.  For that reason,
one should not expect our proxy to work
too well.  But, in fact, it does a reasonable
job at explaining the twists of policy.
Firing costs were reduced in 1977, 1984,
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Figure 6







Worker's Bargaining Power, Spain
Figure 7









Worker's Bargaining Power, U.K.1986, and 1987, following drops in our
measure of the bargaining power.  They
were increased in 1989 and 1990, at times
when the employed’s rent appears to be
high.  Finally, there was a further reduction
in ﬁring costs in 1991, a move that our
proxy clearly fails to predict.
Obviously, this evidence is only indica-
tive and leaves a lot of room for qualiﬁca-
tions,  alternative interpretations, and further
research.  However, it is suggestive that one
can actually identify some regularities in the
timing of labor market reforms.
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have studied the 
circumstances under which there will 
be sufﬁcient support for a high level of
employment protection.  We have argued
that two key determinants of such support
are the employed’s share in bargaining 
and the rate of growth of the economy.
The political viability of a reduction in 
ﬁring costs is highest for low levels of 
the employee’s share and or high growth
rates.  The prediction of our model bears
some resemblance to the real world’s 
experience, although one cannot hope 
for sharp empirical tests when dealing
with political-economy models.
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